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RESURRECTING THE NEGLECTED LIBERTY  
OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 
DEBORAH HELLMAN† 
INTRODUCTION: TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY1 
The liberty of citizens in a democracy has two components—the negative 
liberty to be let alone and the positive liberty of self-government.2 Both are 
crucially important, yet promotion of one can eclipse the other. If individual 
freedom can never be limited, the community is powerless to address 
significant social ills like the Great Depression. At the same time, if the power 
of self-government knows no bounds, individual freedoms can be lost. The 
fact that any democratic government committed to individual rights must 
attend to liberty in both of its forms is a familiar idea. 
Every society must decide how to organize its economy and how 
pervasively to extend market-based principles of distribution and allocation. 
Given the role that governments can and do play in establishing the 
framework within which economic activity takes place, meaningful  
self-government requires that elected officials be able both to set the rules for 
the economy and establish its boundaries. Yet, democratic decisions about the 
reach of the market can affect a person’s ability to exercise her individual 
rights. The positive liberty of self-government must be balanced against the 
negative liberty of individuals to do as they choose. This important and 
familiar tension has been overlooked in the Supreme Court’s current 
campaign finance jurisprudence. While the Court has aggressively protected 
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1 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). By 
“positive liberty,” I mean here Berlin’s early definition of the concept as self-government. Id. at 131-
134. I do not accept the implications of his later argument, which stretches that concept to cover 
other meanings. 
2 Id. at 122, 131. 
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the individual’s interest in spending money to speak, without interference by 
the state, the Court has neglected the individual’s interest in deciding, along 
with others, that politics ought to be walled off from the market. Instead, the 
Supreme Court should safeguard not only individual liberties of speech and 
action but also collective liberties of self-government. 
I.  THE NEGLECTED LIBERTY OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 
Individuals possess a positive liberty of self-government and a negative 
liberty to be let alone. Inevitably, these two liberties come into conflict. When 
the polity restricts what individuals may do, the polity exercises the positive 
liberty of self-government at the expense of the individual’s negative liberty 
to be let alone. This tension cannot be avoided, only recognized and 
thoughtfully balanced. Much of our constitutional law aims to do just this. 
At times, it is the negative liberty that is vindicated, for example when 
the Supreme Court strikes down laws that restrict the individual right to 
possess a handgun in the home or abort an early fetus. Other times, the 
positive liberty wins out, for example when the Court upholds laws that set 
minimum wages or maximum hours. 
According to our fundamental rights doctrine, when the liberty at issue is 
fundamental, that liberty most often is protected. Why are some liberties 
fundamental and others not? This is a perennial question. Indeed, every first 
year student of constitutional law is pressed to explain the difference between 
the substantive due process jurisprudence of today and that of the Lochner3 
era. A common response is to emphasize that economic liberties are more 
likely to receive protection in the political process and thus are less in need 
of judicial protection.4 On this account, the economic liberties at stake in the 
Lochner era cases do not warrant heightened review because they are less 
vulnerable. Although the vulnerability of the liberty is one plausible way to 
explain the bifurcation in our constitutional law between its treatment of 
economic liberties and so-called “personal” liberties, there is another, possibly 
more fruitful, approach. Rather than focusing on the relative vulnerability of 
the negative liberty infringed, perhaps we should focus on the significance of 
the positive liberty that is exercised. 
The regulation of the economy is a central aspect of self-government. 
Where such an important dimension of self-government is involved, courts 
 
3 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
4 See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 41 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 147, 175-76 (1999) (arguing that “there is neither need nor good argument for aggressive 
judicial protection” of economic liberties); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 278 
(1977) (arguing that laws limiting the liberty of contract are unlikely to “give effect to external 
preferences” and thus are not in need of judicial protection). 
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have a reason to defer to legislative decisions. On this account, the cases of the 
Lochner era were properly rejected not because the personal liberties at issue 
were unimportant or secure but instead because the liberty of self-government 
at stake was so momentous. The thrust of this insight is this: when the polity, 
through its representatives, makes decisions that implicate the liberty of  
self-government most strongly, those decisions deserve extra deference. What 
decisions are these? This will be a difficult line to draw, though no harder than 
delineating fundamental from non-fundamental individual rights. 
II.  TRANSLATING THIS THEORY INTO A LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Buckley v. Valeo5 and its progeny neglect the positive liberty of  
self-government. Restrictions on spending money to speak and giving money 
to candidates in elections do implicate the negative liberty of free speech. But 
these restrictions are also especially important exercises of the positive liberty 
of self-government. In essence, the aim and effect of campaign finance laws 
is to insulate politics from the market to avoid the translation of economic 
success into political success.6 
Campaign finance laws take different forms but in essence they draw a 
boundary around the economic market and restrict its influence. Money buys 
many things in our society. What money can buy is sometimes controversial 
(e.g., when high-priced lawyering affects judicial outcomes or private 
education affects opportunities) and other times not (e.g., when money buys 
nice homes and expensive clothes). A polity’s decision about what money can 
buy is a central and important aspect of self-government, and similar in kind 
to its determinations about the basic structure of the economy. When 
Congress or a state legislature determines that the domain of politics should 
be walled off from the domain of the economy, this is a decision that deserves 
a substantial degree of respect. 
Indeed, the current Supreme Court has already acknowledged the polity’s 
interest in erecting a barrier between economic power and political power. 
The Court permits campaign finance laws that restrict speech when and to 
the extent that they prevent corruption.7 While defenders of campaign 
finance laws lament the overly narrow conception of corruption that the 
 
5 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
6 See, for example, the law struck down in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), which provided matching public funds to candidates running against 
privately funded candidates. 
7 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo 
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.”). 
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Court accepts,8 even a narrow concern with avoiding the quid pro quo 
exchange of money for political acts (what most would call simply bribery) 
recognizes the positive liberty of self-government at issue. 
The polity has a compelling interest in forbidding bribery of public 
officials and candidates for office because laws that restrict the sale of official 
acts for money insulate the political sphere from the market sphere, limiting 
the ability of wealthy individuals and institutions to translate that wealth into 
political outcomes they favor. If the polity cannot wall off politics from the 
market, it loses its most precious form of self-government. 
By acknowledging that the government can prohibit bribery of public 
officials, the Supreme Court has, albeit implicitly, already acknowledged the 
interest in self-government that is implicated in campaign finance laws.9 Yet, 
the Court has not understood this interest in these terms. As a result, the 
Court has failed to recognize and appropriately weigh the important  
self-government interest that is also in play in campaign finance cases. When 
the Court strikes down a law because it limits freedom of speech, the Court 
does not determine how that freedom should be exercised or what it should 
be used to say. Similarly, when the Court recognizes the positive liberty of 
self-government at issue in a law that criminalizes the bribery of public 
officials,10 the Court has reasons to defer to the legislature’s judgment about 
how this liberty of self-government is properly used. A key error of the 
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, then, is not only that it has defined 
corruption too narrowly but that it has been too eager to define it itself.11 The 
democratically elected branches of government have a more significant role 
to play in this task than the Court has thus far recognized. 
The legal argument for recognizing the positive liberty of self-government 
at stake in campaign finance laws could take either of two forms. As suggested 
above, the Court could treat campaign finance law’s implicit determination of 
what constitutes corruption more deferentially on the grounds that these laws 
are central exercises of self-government. Alternatively, the Court could 
 
8 See, e.g., ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S 
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 2 (2014) (“Corruption, in the American tradition, does not just 
include blatant bribes and theft from the public till, but encompasses many situations where 
politicians and public institutions serve private interests at the public’s expense.”). 
9 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
10 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (concluding that extortion “is completed at 
the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific 
official acts”); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 274 (1991) (finding that quid pro quo is 
“necessary for conviction under the Hobbs Act when an official receives a campaign contribution”). 
11 See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 1385, 1402 (2013) (criticizing courts for attempting to define corruption because it is a derivative 
concept that “depends on a conception of the role of a legislator in a well-functioning democracy” 
and emphasizing that, in other areas, the Court is reluctant to define good government). 
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recognize that these laws implicate two important liberty interests: the 
negative liberty to be free to speak and the positive liberty to insulate the 
political domain from the influences of wealth. While the strict scrutiny 
framework makes either course somewhat difficult to operationalize—as one 
might wonder how such strict scrutiny can be combined with deference or 
with recognition of a second fundamental liberty at stake—it is not without 
precedent. We find deference combined with strict scrutiny in university 
affirmative action cases. For example, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court both 
strictly scrutinizes the university’s use of race in admissions and defers to the 
university’s judgment about the need for diversity.12 While Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Court in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, casts some doubt 
on the degree of deference that is permitted,13 Grutter still provides some basis 
for the view that when other constitutional values are in play (the University’s 
First Amendment–based right to make educational judgments about how 
class composition affects learning), both scrutiny and deference have roles to 
play.14 The Court’s abortion case law provides an example of an arena in which 
the Supreme Court recognizes the existence of two important rights that 
need to be balanced: the woman’s freedom to determine whether to continue 
her pregnancy and the state’s interest in the developing fetal life which 
becomes increasingly important over the course of the pregnancy.15 Because 
of the weight of the state’s interest in developing fetal life, the Court holds 
that restrictions on the right of the woman to choose to abort the fetus must 
only avoid being unduly burdensome.16 Drawing on this doctrine, one could 
say that because the state’s interest in defending its elections from the 
influence of wealth relates to a central exercise of self-government, 
restrictions on the right to use money to speak will be upheld so long as they 
do not unduly burden an individual’s right to engage in political speech. 
 
12 See 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity 
is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”). 
13 See 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (noting that only “some, but not complete, judicial deference 
[to universities] is proper”). 
14 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (“Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a 
degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”). 
15 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 858 (1992) (recognizing a woman’s 
liberty interest in continuing the pregnancy and the state’s interest in fetal protection). 
16 See id. at 846 (noting a woman’s right “to choose to have an abortion before viability and to 
obtain it without undue interference from the State”). While I do not agree with the Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence, nonetheless, this doctrine provides an important precedent for the position 
that even fundamental rights sometimes must be balanced against other interests of comparable 
weight. 
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III.  CHALLENGING THE ARGUMENT 
The assertion that the liberty of self-government is being inappropriately 
neglected in the Court’s campaign finance cases gives rise to (at least) two 
challenges that must be addressed. First, one might wonder whether the 
positive liberty of self-government is plausibly in play in any and every case. 
If positive liberty is at play, defenders of laws limiting rights—forbidding gun 
ownership or abortion, for example—might also be able to make an argument 
analogous to the one I have offered here. Second, if the legislative branches 
of government are entitled to deference when exercising their positive liberty 
of self-government, will this approach enable current politicians to protect 
and entrench their own power? In other words, without judicial oversight, 
does this approach amount to the fox guarding the hen house? I address each 
of these challenges below. 
The first challenge rightly notes that self-government is implicated in any 
law that a state or national legislature passes. This is why, of course, court 
invalidation of legislative acts is always, at least potentially, controversial. In 
elevating this interest in self-government, I do not intend to suggest that the 
Court lacks the power of judicial review. Rather, I claim that certain laws 
constitute central exercises of self-government and, in such cases, this liberty 
interest should be given significant weight. The argument offered here rests 
on the claim that structuring the economy and delineating its scope are 
central exercises of self-government.17 
Second, campaign finance laws not only insulate political power from 
economic power, they also establish the rules by which political power is 
maintained and transferred. If the elected branches are entitled to deference 
in such cases because of the importance of the self-government liberty at 
stake, this approach might open the door to extreme incumbency protection 
and other distortions of the political process. This is a serious concern. When 
laws affect the political process itself, there are special reasons for judicial 
oversight.18 While this is correct, the point suggests that courts should 
evaluate campaign finance laws to ensure that they do not entrench 
incumbents and to make certain the channels of political change are indeed 
open. This reason for invalidating such laws is fairly circumscribed and would 
 
17 In this piece, I sketch the argument that laws which constitute central exercise of self-government 
deserve more deference than other laws. I cannot also develop the argument that laws regulating the 
economy constitute central exercises of self-government. While I think the claim has intuitive 
appeal, a full defense would require more discussion than is possible here. 
18 As John Hart Ely famously emphasized, courts have a special role to play in “[c]learing the 
[c]hannels of [p]olitical [c]hange.” JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 105 (1980). 
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thus allow for far more campaign finance regulation than under current 
doctrine. 
Thus courts do have a role to play. First, they must assess whether the law 
at issue is a central exercise of self-government. It is likely that any campaign 
finance law will satisfy this criterion as these laws separate the domain of 
politics from the domain of the market economy and therefore constitute a 
central commitment of a polity. Second, courts must make sure that the law 
at issue does not entrench incumbents. Third, laws that restrict contributions 
and expenditures implicate both the negative liberty to speak and the positive 
liberty to keep politics insulated from wealth. As both aspects of liberty are 
involved, courts have a third role to play in balancing the effects on each form 
of liberty of the particular law at issue. 
CONCLUSION: DISTINCT ADVANTAGES 
 Laws limiting campaign giving and spending are central exercises in  
self-government because they delineate the boundaries of the sphere of 
politics and of the economy. One further sphere worth discussing is the press. 
It is sometimes suggested that if political equality is treated as another 
compelling interest that justifies limits on campaign giving and spending, the 
inequality between press-speakers and other speakers will require 
justification.19 The self-government rationale for campaign finance laws 
avoids this problem. Together, we have a liberty interest in deciding for 
ourselves the role that economic power will play in other domains. When we 
exercise this power in a particular way, via a campaign finance law, we need 
not do so in a manner that is completely consistent as a matter of principle. 
Just as the speaker exercising her right of free speech can adopt views that 
others find not fully consistent, so too can we, collectively, adopt policies that 
are realistic accommodations of several of our values.  
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